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ABSTRACT  
Performance measures and rewards are becoming commonplace in public sector 
organizations. This paper studies the implementation of performance-related pay (PRP) 
mechanisms in the boards of directors of the Foundation Trusts (FTs) of the National 
Health Service (NHS) in England and analyzes whether their remuneration is linked to 
organizational performance using qualitative and quantitative analyses (structural 
equation model). FTs operate in a favorable context for implementing PRP to 
remunerate executive directors. Our results show that many FTs have not implemented 
PRP and hardly any report having payed bonuses. However, most of them disclose that 
they carry out some kind of performance appraisal. These results indicate both 
reluctance to and difficulties in adopting PRP in public sector entities. Results also 
suggest that executive directors of NHS FTs are stewards in an “odd” kingdom that uses 
performance ratings to evaluate organizations, blaming directors when ratings are bad, 
but with no rewards when good performance is achieved. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The motivation of workers and managers is a key element for the success of any 
organization. Academic literature in general, and the International Public Management 
Journal in particular, has devoted significant attention to this issue in the public sector 
(among others, Anderfuhren-Biget et al. 2010; Choi and Whitford 2017; Langbein 
2010; Le Grand 2010; Lewis 2010; Moynihan 2013; Wright and Christensen 2010; 
Wright, Christensen, and Pandey 2013). Under New Public Management (NPM), 
performance measures and rewards have become commonplace in public sector 
organizations. Frey, Homberg, and Osterloch (2013) argue that these measures can raise 
public servants’ motivation and enhance service quality. More pay for better 
performance (performance-related pay, performance pay, or pay for performance) has 
long been the mantra behind the personnel reforms under NPM (Bellé 2015). The 
implementation of PRP initiatives has raised the question of whether public sector 
professionals, in the words of Le Grand (2010), “are ‘knaves’, motivated primarily by 
self-interest, or ‘knights’, motivated by altruism and the desire to provide a public 
service.”  
The adoption of business-like incentive structures in the public sector, in 
particular, the introduction of performance-related pay (PRP), has been one of the most 
significant challenges of NPM reforms (Weibel, Rost, and Osterloh 2010). Bellé (2015) 
states that the use of monetary incentives in the public sector seems to have enjoyed a 
recent resurgence in interest and popularity. Recently, Bajorek and Bevan (2015) 
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conducted a review of the literature on the effectiveness and value for money of PRP in 
the UK public sector. Their findings were mixed, with PRP scheme effectiveness often 
dependent on scheme design and organizational context. Several authors argue that PRP 
may not produce the desired results in the public sector (see, e.g., Christensen, 
Paarlberg, and Perry 2017; Bellé 2015; Bregn 2013; Brewer and Walker 2013; 
Langbein 2010; Ritz, Brewer, and Neumann 2016; Weibel et al. 2010). Motivation and 
pay are more likely to be substitutes than complements in the public sector; therefore, 
PRP may have unintended adverse consequences and more analyses of the relationship 
between performance and pay are necessary in this sector (Langbein 2010).  
National Health Service (NHS) Foundation Trusts (FTs) are autonomous public 
sector organizations within the NHS and provide over half of all NHS hospital, mental 
health, and ambulance services in England. Monitor, an independent public agency, 
regulates the FTs and monitors their performance using a defined and specific set of 
performance measures. FTs provide a suitable environment in which to study the 
implementation of PRP, for three reasons. First, Monitor backs the implementation of 
some type of PRP mechanism. Second, the top management teams of the FTs are 
structured in boards of directors. Third, their performance is assessed with specific 
performance measures which are periodically disclosed and, thus, easy to track.   
This paper has two objectives. First, to study the level of implementation of PRP 
mechanisms to remunerate the boards of directors of the FTs. For this purpose, we 
review the remuneration sections of the annual reports published by the FTs. Second, to 
study whether the remuneration of the directors, in particular the executive directors, is 
linked to the performance of these organizations. For this purpose, we use the structural 
equation model, partial least square (SEM-PLS) approach, to analyze, in a single model, 
the relationship between board remuneration and financial performance and service 
4 
 
quality. The paper provides evidence about the reluctance to and difficulties in adopting 
PRP in public sector entities, even in a favorable organizational context. The paper is 
structured as follows. The next section reviews the literature about the impact of PRP 
mechanisms in the public sector, in general, and in the healthcare sector, in particular. 
Then, the characteristics of FTs are explained. After the research design and the results 
sections, findings are discussed and conclusions are drawn.  
 
PERFORMANCE-RELATED PAY IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
General Issues about PRP in the Public Sector 
PRP is built on the premise that rewards can foster appropriate behavior and that 
money is a potentially powerful incentive to influence the efforts that employees will 
make on behalf of the organization (Suff, Reilly, and Cox 2007). The payments may be 
made through the form of permanent supplements or lump-sum bonuses. However, 
compensation systems can either hinder or enhance organizational performance 
(Condrey, Facer II, and Llorens 2012). PRP is an appeal to the self-interest of workers 
to improve performance because if the benefits of making more (or different) efforts 
exceed the costs associated with doing so, they will change their behavior accordingly 
(Bregn 2013).  
The problems related to the implementation of PRP systems exist both in the 
private and public sectors, although they are more evident in the latter, and include 
greater difficulties of measuring performance (Langbein 2010). Public organizations 
have difficulties in defining ex-post or results-oriented control mechanisms (Carlin and 
Guthrie 2001). In addition, in many occasions the difficulty is to identify those 
responsible for performance achievements (Mannion and Davies 2008). In order to be 
effective and to have the potential to inflict reputational damage, performance 
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assessments must be robust to criticism from those being assessed, understood by the 
public, and widely reported (Bevan 2010). Eijkenaar et al. (2013) argue that PRP is 
more effective when the performance measures are very specific and easy to track. 
A robust measure of performance has to fulfill three criteria in public sector 
organizations (Brewer and Walker 2013). First, it should be a multidimensional measure 
that covers the many concerns of management, such as quality, efficiency, 
effectiveness, responsiveness, and equity. Second, there should be general agreement 
among the stakeholders about what constitutes high levels of performance. Third, 
performance measures should include a range of information about the organization, 
some of which may be archival. This could include data from performance indicators, 
strategic and operational plans, and inspectors’ reports.  
In addition to performance measurement itself, another problem is that, even 
though professionals perform individual jobs well, the organization may falter if it does 
not have the proper mechanisms to connect good individual performance to 
organizational goals (Lewis 2010). In practice, the attribution of rewards to those 
responsible for improved performance is difficult (Mannion and Davies 2008). The 
results of Ducharme, Singh, and Podolsky (2005), in a private sector context, show that 
performance appraisal and the fact that those evaluated have clear information about the 
results are fundamental for the success of PRP systems. PRP can be more effective 
when directed at individuals or small teams than when directed at large groups 
(Eijkenaar et al. 2013). 
PRP is oriented to obtain the desired outcomes and reinforce the behaviors 
(Perry, Engbers, and Jun 2009). Goal setting theory argues that future goals or 
anticipated outcomes can be used to influence behavior and motivation and that the 
mere existence of goals can lead people to behave in ways that help to attain those goals 
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(Suff et al. 2007). This theory places less emphasis on rewards and stresses the 
motivating power of defining appropriate work goals and engaging employee 
commitment to them (Marsden 2004). Goal setting theory was refined in a number of 
ways through the expectancy theory, whose main argument is that motivation depends 
on whether the outcomes hold psychological value or “valence” for the individual (Suff 
et al. 2007). Therefore, employee effort is determined by valence, i.e., the value of the 
expected outcome (pecuniary as well as non-pecuniary) associated with a given choice 
of effort (Bregn 2013).  
Many studies have focused on pay as a particularly important motivator in both 
the public and private sectors, but empirical studies suggest that public employees have 
a different incentive structure from their private sector counterparts (Kim 2010). The 
public sector has characteristics which may hinder the adoption of PRP, and theories 
based on self-interest cannot provide sufficient grounds to analyze the motivation of 
employees in the public sector (Perry et al. 2009; Weibel et al. 2010). When workers 
obtain utility from the actions they take in their jobs, they may make the same effort 
with no additional bonus payments (Dixit 2002). This effect is more likely to occur in 
the public sector than in the private sector, and government entities may take advantage 
of this fact, especially when there are budget or financial constraints.  
Public Service Motivation and Stewardship Approaches 
The different behavior of private and public sector workers can be explained by 
the type of rewards and motivations they value most (Wright and Christensen 2010). In 
the public sector, the public service motivation (PSM) approach has been widely used to 
explain the behavior of its workers (Carpenter, Doverspike, and Miguel 2012). 
Bozeman and Su (2015) provide a review of the concepts involved in the PSM theory 
and highlight the diversity of the multiple conceptualizations of PSM. In their review, 
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they present the evolution of the definitions of PSM, which range from the “individual’s 
predisposition to respond to motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public 
institutions and organizations” (Perry and Wise 1990) to a broader concept, proposed by 
Kjeldsen (2012), which includes “individuals’ motivation to contribute to society and 
help other people through the delivery of public services (i.e., services ordered and 
fully/partly paid for by the public) regardless of whether this takes place in the public or 
private sectors.” French and Emerson (2014) distinguish between public service and 
public sector motivation, the latter including the intrinsic and extrinsic rewards 
associated with employment in the public sector such as job security and tenure, career 
prospects and pension systems.  
PSM is not a public sector phenomenon but belongs to all sectors (Bozeman and 
Su 2015). However, normative commitment -the sense of obligation, duty, and loyalty- 
is more relevant in the public than in the private sector, due to the nature and content of 
both the explicit employment contract and implicit psychological contracts (Markovits 
et al. 2010). Public sector workers share an idealistic and ethical purpose with the entity 
they work for, so they obtain utility from working in this sector (Dixit 2002). Their 
commitment is more related to intrinsic rewards (such as self-determination, personal 
enthusiasm, altruism, reputation, job satisfaction) than to extrinsic rewards (such as 
salaries or monetary reward) (Anderfuhren-Biget et al. 2010; Georgellis, Iossa, and 
Tabvuma 2011; Lee and Wilkins 2011). When employees are intrinsically motivated by 
public service, PRP might harm an initial motivation to perform well in a job (Bregn 
2013). Public managers are intrinsically motivated; thus, a pay incentive will not 
necessarily stimulate them to perform better (Jobome 2006). According to some authors 
(e.g., Ritz et al. 2016), in the public sector, PRP can be counterproductive. The 
introduction of PRP reduces the intrinsically motivated component of additional effort 
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to a greater extent than it increases the extrinsic component of such effort (Weibel et al. 
2010). PRP may often hinder employees from focusing on results that are important to 
the organization (Langbein 2010). Monetary incentives for activities with a prosocial 
impact may crowd out employee motivation (Bellé 2015). 
Together with PSM, Stewardship theory can also be used to explain top 
managers’ actions in the public sector (see, e.g., Ellwood and García-Lacalle 2015). 
This theory is seen as a particular case of agency theory in which the owner (principal) 
and the management (agents) have similar objectives, thus, minimizing traditional 
principal-agent conflicts (Caers et al. 2006). The Stewardship theory proposes that 
stewards are motivated to act in the best interests of their principals and make decisions 
that are in the best interests of the overall organization in cases where different 
stakeholders express competing objectives (Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson 1997) 
because they are motivated by intrinsic, rather than extrinsic, rewards (Boyd, Haynes, 
and Zona 2011).  
Performance and Remuneration in the Healthcare Sector 
The academic literature provides systematic reviews of the specific effect of 
PRP in the healthcare sector (Eijkenaar et al. 2013; Ogundeji, Bland, and Sheldon 2016; 
van Herck et al. 2010). Van Herck et al. (2010) found that the effectiveness of PRP 
programs is highly variable, from negative (rarely) or absent to positive or very positive. 
Eijkenaar et al. (2013) concluded that there is insufficient evidence to support or not to 
support the use of PRP in the sector, as the results of the few studies are mixed. Ryan, 
Blustein, and Casalino (2012) analyzed a PRP program in U.S. hospitals whose main 
goal was to encourage greater quality improvement, particularly among lower-
performing hospitals. Their findings raise questions about the effectiveness of economic 
incentives to improve quality in the healthcare sector. Gillam, Siriwardena, and Steel 
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(2012), in the UK primary care setting, concluded that observed improvements in 
quality of care for chronic diseases in the PRP framework were modest and that the 
impact on costs, professional behavior and patient experience was uncertain. Fleetcroft 
et al. (2012) found similar results, with no association between the size of the financial 
incentive and outcomes. Ogundeji et al. (2016), after a meta-analysis of PRP 
mechanisms in healthcare, conclude that their effectiveness in improving healthcare 
performance has been variable and modest, particularly in improving health outcomes. 
Moreover, they state that evaluations are often poorly designed and lack adequate 
controls and, so, over-estimate the results of these mechanisms.  
Our study is focused on the remuneration of the boards of directors of public 
hospitals. Academic literature on this topic is scarce, focused on the remuneration of the 
CEOs, and mainly carried out in the U.S. context where CEO compensation in 
government hospitals is significantly lower than in private non-profit hospitals (Ballou 
and Weisbrod 2003; Eldenburg and Krishnan 2003). Ballou and Weisbrod (2003) found 
that the CEOs of government hospitals receive lower bonuses than those of private non-
profit hospitals. This lower remuneration might be due to poor selection, government 
hospitals do not hire the best executives, or incentive problems (Ballou and Weisbrod 
2003; Eldenburg and Krishnan 2003). However, Ballou and Weisbrod (2003) also 
provide another interpretation: an unmeasured compensating differential. CEOs who 
prefer to work in the public sector may be willing to accept lower cash compensation in 
exchange for the opportunity to work in this particular environment, characterized by, 
for example, greater job security and low stress levels. Weibel et al. (2010) argue that 
PRP can successfully boost personal efforts in the case of less interesting tasks, but 
managers perform tasks that are intrinsically motivating, which reduces the validity of 
PRP in this group of qualified workers. Hospitals that have incentive programs are 
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much more likely to reward the strong financial performance of CEOs than the 
production of high quality care (Ballou and Weisbrod 2003; Preyra and Pink 2001).   
Newton (2015) found, in large non-profit U.S. hospitals, a negative and 
statistically significant relationship between CEO compensation, measured as the CEO-
to-employee relative pay, and organizational performance which may be due to poor 
governance quality. Cardinaels (2009), for Dutch non-profit private hospitals, found that 
CEOs, on average, earn more when the hospital’s supervisory board members have a 
lower level of expertise and receive more remuneration. 
Ballantine, Forker, and Greenwood (2008) study the relationship between CEO 
pay, CEO turnover and organizational performance in NHS acute hospital trusts. NHS 
trusts were the predecessors of the NHS FTs. These authors found a significant 
relationship between low performance, in particular for financial performance, and CEO 
turnover, but they did not find any relationship between financial performance and CEO 
pay or between service quality and CEO pay. Ballantine et al. (2008) excluded FTs 
from their analyses because they warrant separate study and called for further research 
to investigate these relationships in FTs.  
 
GOVERNANCE, REMUNERATION AND PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT IN 
THE FTs 
FTs are autonomous public sector organizations within the NHS. FTs provide 
over half of all NHS hospital, mental health, and ambulance services in England. They 
are managed by a board of directors and operate in a context of competition, because 
patients can choose the hospital in which they are treated. The FTs authorized at the end 
of the 2012/13 financial year generated total revenues of almost £39 billion with nearly 
600,000 professionals working on whole time equivalents (Monitor 2013a).  
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The FTs operate in a strong governance environment (see e.g., Ellwood and 
Garcia-Lacalle 2016). The FTs governance structure consists of two boards: a board of 
governors and a board of directors. The board of governors represents the interests of 
FT members and partner organizations in the local community, holds the board of 
directors to account for the performance of the FT, and exercises statutory duties. This 
board acts like a parliament. The board of directors consists of both executive and non-
executive directors and has great freedom to decide its own strategy and the way 
services are run. Its members “are ultimately and collectively responsible as a board for 
all aspects of the performance of the foundation trust” (Monitor 2010, 4). Therefore, the 
board of directors is a clearly identifiable “small” team responsible for the performance 
of the FT. The executive directors manage the day-to-day operational and financial 
performance of the FT. The non-executive directors do not have responsibility for the 
day-to-day management, but share the board’s collective responsibility for ensuring that 
the organization is run efficiently, economically, and effectively. They scrutinize the 
executive management’s performance in meeting agreed goals and monitor the 
reporting of performance.  
Monitor, an independent regulatory body, authorizes NHS organizations to 
become FTs and is responsible for ensuring that FTs are well governed in terms of 
service quality and financial performance. Monitor has issued a Code of Governance 
(The Code), with a “comply or explain” approach, to help FT boards to improve their 
governance practices.  
Non-executive directors “are responsible for determining appropriate levels of 
remuneration of executive directors” (Monitor 2010, 10). The Code’s provisions include 
the establishment of a remuneration committee composed of non-executive directors. 
This committee is responsible for setting the remuneration of the executive directors 
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and decides whether a proportion of the executive directors’ remuneration should be 
linked to corporate and/or individual performance, including annual bonuses. The main 
principle for establishing the remuneration of the directors of the FTs is set in Monitor’s 
Code of Governance: “Levels of remuneration should be sufficient to attract, retain and 
motivate directors of the quality and with the skills and experience required to lead the 
NHS foundation trust successfully, but an NHS foundation trust should avoid paying 
more than is necessary for this purpose” (Monitor 2010, 23). This principle is clarified 
with supporting principles to help remuneration committees to set pay levels. The 
remuneration committees should consider whether the executive directors are eligible 
for annual bonuses. If so, “performance conditions should be relevant, stretching and 
designed to match the long term interests of the public and patients” (Monitor 2010, 
23). For the chairman and other non-executive directors, the Code recommends that 
their levels of remuneration should reflect the time commitment and responsibilities of 
their roles. External professional advice is usually used to set the remuneration of the 
non-executive directors according to the benchmarks for this activity.  
 FTs must disclose detailed information about the remuneration of executive and 
non-executive members of the board. Performance criteria and any upper limits for 
annual bonuses and incentive schemes should be set and disclosed (Monitor 2010). In 
addition, FTs were required by Monitor (2013b) to disclose, in the remuneration section 
of their annual reports, for each senior manager, the salary and allowances, 
performance-related bonuses, contribution to pension plans and other relevant 
information, in bands of £5,000. This information was subject to audit. In addition, 
narrative, non-audited information, such as the policy on the remuneration of senior 
managers for current and future financial years, must be reported. In particular, “an 
explanation of relative importance of the relevant proportions of remuneration which 
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are, and which are not, subject to performance conditions” (Monitor 2013b, 80). 
Following the Hutton report of fair pay (Lord Hutton Report 2011), remuneration 
should be considered, and reported, both in absolute terms and in terms of the level of 
remuneration of the workforce. This information is known as the “Hutton disclosure.” 
Therefore, FTs informed about the remuneration of the highest paid director, as well as 
the relationship between this remuneration and the median remuneration of the 
organization’s workforce.  
FTs have the freedom to set the remuneration of their managers and workers, but 
they remain part of the NHS and, thus, influenced by the situation of the public sector in 
general, and the Department of Health (DoH) and the NHS in particular. The financial 
year analyzed (2012/13) was within the period of financial constraints in the public 
sector due to the last financial crisis. In 2010, at the beginning of this crisis, the DoH 
issued a document that established some principles to manage the NHS, the largest 
public service in the country, which included a statement about the need for fiscal 
consolidation and required sustained pay restraint across the NHS (DoH 2010).  
Monitor measures the performance of the FTs. For the financial year 2012/13, 
Monitor’s assessment was conducted under the Compliance Framework (Monitor 
2012). This framework used a rating approach that provided an indication of whether 
the FT was well governed, financially robust and met the required quality threshold. 
Monitor’s regulatory process consisted of several stages, including monitoring, risk 
assessment, and intervention, if necessary. When a FT consistently failed to meet 
national standards of care or was at financial risk, Monitor increased its surveillance, 
required it to explain why it had failed and to develop a plan for fixing the problem. If 
the problems continued, Monitor could use its statutory powers of intervention. These 
powers included, among others, the possibility of requiring the board to seek external 
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advice and even to remove all the members of the board of directors and appoint interim 
directors (Monitor 2012).  
 Monitor assessed financial performance using the financial risk rating (FRR), 
which has a 5-level scale (“1” worst performance and “5” best performance). The FRR 
assessment included the analysis of financial performance, financial efficiency and 
liquidity. Service quality is mainly measured using the governance risk rating (GRR), 
which is a 4-traffic-light system: green (best performance), amber-green, amber-red and 
red (worst performance). The GRR assessment included the monitoring of service 
performance scores in areas such as compliance with quality indicators of patient safety, 
clinical effectiveness and patient experience, and compliance with the delivery of 
mandatory services. Therefore, FTs had clear and specific overall performance ratings 
which allowed Monitor to establish their level of financial performance and service 
quality. FTs ratings were published in the website of Monitor and in their websites and 
their annual reports, so stakeholders had a clear idea of the performance of the FTs. 
These ratings were key for FTs because they were the ones used by Monitor to assess 
their financial performance and service quality. Depending on the ratings achieved, 
Monitor modulated its surveillance intensity and decided whether to intervene or not in 
the management of the FTs.  
The existence of a transparent performance regime and the presence of boards of 
directors that are responsible for the performance of these organizations create a 
favorable organizational context for adopting PRP mechanisms in the FTs. Our analyses 
aim to determine whether the implementation of PRP mechanisms in FTs has taken 
place and to identify factors that explain the remuneration of their directors, paying 
particular attention to the relationship between performance and remuneration.  
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RESEARCH DESIGN 
Sample and Methodology 
In the financial year 2012/13, there were 144 FTs suitable for the analysis (with 
data for the whole financial year). The four ambulance FTs have been excluded because 
they provide a different service from the other FTs. Both qualitative and quantitative 
analyses have been carried out. First, a qualitative content analysis of the remuneration 
section included in the annual reports for the year 2012/13. In this qualitative analysis of 
the 140 FTs, we looked for the following information required by Monitor in its 
reporting manual for 2012/13 (Monitor 2013b): 1) explanation of the remuneration 
policy, that is, some statement about the main mechanisms used for setting the 
remuneration of the executive members of the boards; 2) explicit statements about the 
adoption, or not, of a PRP scheme in the FT; 3) whether the tables with the salary and 
pension entitlements of senior managers included a column with the bonus received by 
the members of the boards; and 4) the bonuses reported. This last item, the disclosure of 
performance-related bonuses, was reported in bands of £5,000 and subject to audit.  
Quantitative analyses allow us to study whether remuneration compensates for 
higher levels of performance and whether there are undisclosed PRP mechanisms when 
organizations do not report paying bonuses. Our quantitative analysis has been carried 
out with data referring to two financial years (2012/13 and 2011/12), that have been 
obtained directly from FTs’ annual reports and financial statements, available from 
either Monitor’s or the FTs’ websites. For the analysis using only data for 2012/13, our 
sample consists of 130 FTs, more than 90% of the total FT population for the year. For 
the analysis that includes data for 2011/12, our sample consists of 122 FTs. Some FTs 
were not taken into account for the quantitative analyses because of missing data. The 
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Mid Staffordshire FT has also been excluded because, during that year, it was subjected 
to intervention by Monitor.  
The structural equation model, partial least square (SEM-PLS) approach, with 
SmartPLS 2.0 software, has been used for the quantitative analysis. The main 
advantages of this technique are the following: 1) It can use constructs as variables. 
Constructs are made up of several items or indicators to better capture the 
characteristics of the complex “reality” to be studied, strengthening the results and their 
interpretation. 2) It allows the inclusion of more than one dependent variable in the 
same model. 3) It allows the study of interactions among variables (or constructs), so 
complex relationships between variables with direct and indirect effects can be tested 
(Serrano-Cinca, Fuertes-Callén, and Gutiérrez-Nieto 2007). 4) Lastly, while other 
approaches to the SEM (such as covariance-based methods) have strong sample-size 
requirements, PLS restrictions are generally much smaller.  
Measurement of Variables for the Quantitative Analysis 
Dependent Variables: Expenses per Board Member 
Two constructs have been created to capture the remuneration of board 
members: ExecDirRemun and NonExecDirRemun. ExecDirRemun is a construct made 
up of two items. The first is the natural log of the average total expenses per executive 
director (meanExecExp), calculated as total expenses of the executive directors in the 
FT divided by the number of executive directors. We include a second item 
(relatExecExp) that compares the remuneration of the executive directors to the salary 
level of the rest of the staff. This item is measured as the ratio of the average expenses 
per executive director divided by the average expenses per employee. The inclusion of 
the “relative salary” item is in line with the analysis carried out by Newton (2015) and 
with the idea underlying the “Hutton disclosure.” The inclusion of these two items in 
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the same construct allows us to better capture the average level of the remuneration of 
the executive directors (both in total and relative terms). NonExecDirRemun is a 
construct made up of two items, in a similar way to ExecDirRemun: meanNonexecExp 
is the natural log of the average total expenses per non-executive director, calculated as 
total expenses of non-executive directors divided by the number of the non-executive 
directors, chairperson included; and relatNonexecExp, which is the ratio of the average 
expenses per non-executive director divided by the average expenses per employee. The 
number of board members, both executive and non-executive, has been considered as 
those at the end of the financial year, as disclosed in the annual report. We use the total 
expenses incurred by FTs in relation to executive and non-executive directors as a proxy 
for their overall remuneration for two reasons. First, individual information for the 
salary and other remuneration was provided in salary bands of £5,000. Second, total 
expenses include all possible benefits received by board members, short term, post-
employment, and termination benefits (Monitor 2013b).  
Explanatory Variables: Performance Ratings 
Two constructs have been created with the quarterly ratings, one for financial 
performance (FP) and one for service quality (SQ), obtaining two measures that reflect 
the multidimensional performance of the FTs. The option of using constructs to capture 
annual performance is more adequate than using only the ratings of the fourth quarter or 
than calculating the average rating for the year. An average rating would mean treating 
a FT which has obtained ratings of 4, 4, 2 and 2 and a FT which has consistently 
achieved a rating of 3 throughout the year as equals. Monitor would have enforced 
different actions in each case. FP includes the FRRs for the 4 quarters (from “5” best 
performance to “1” lowest performance). SQ, the measurement of service quality, 
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transforms the colors of the GRRs into numbers: green = “4”; amber-green = “3”; 
amber-red = “2”; and red = “1.” 
Control Variables: Organizational Characteristics 
The following variables have been introduced into the model to control for 
organizational characteristics that may influence the remuneration of the boards of 
directors: size, the type of services provided (mental or acute), location and the 
complexity of the assets managed. Size is included as a construct made up of three 
indicators (in their natural log form): book value of total assets at the end of the year, 
total operating income during the year and full-time equivalent staff during the year. 
The rest of the control variables are included as single indicators. The use of single-item 
indicators (or constructs) is not restricted in PLS (Hair et al. 2012). In order to capture 
the type of services provided by each FT, the classification of the Hospitals Estates and 
Facilities has been used. This classification distinguishes 3 main categories of FTs: 
mental and care hospitals, acute hospitals and ambulance services. As stated, ambulance 
FTs have been excluded from the analyses. Therefore, a dummy variable, type of 
services, has been defined: “1” when the FT is a mental health hospital and “0” for 
acute hospitals. Location is represented by a dummy variable which takes value “1” for 
FTs located in the London or the South East Coast areas and “0” otherwise. According 
to the DoH (2012), these areas have the highest costs. The complexity variable is the 
proportion of the book value of non-current assets over the book value of total assets 
and it is used as a measure of an entity’s strategic flexibility (Newton 2015).  
Model Specification 
Figure 1 shows the model tested with SEM-PLS. The constructs for the 
remuneration of the executive and non-executive directors are the dependent variables 
in our model. FP and SQ capture the performance of the FTs, according to their 
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financial and service quality ratings, respectively. Size, type of services, location and 
complexity are included in the model as control variables to study their direct 
relationship with the remuneration of both executive and non-executive directors as well 
as their indirect association with these remunerations through their relationship with 
performance. Because the relationship between performance and pay might be 
somewhat delayed, that is, short-term payments for performance may be effective in the 
same or the following year, we build two SEM-PLS models. Directors’ remuneration 
refers to the year 2012/13 in the two models. In Model 1, with 130 FTs, the 
performance, FP and SQ, and control variables correspond to the 2012/13 financial 
year. In Model 2, with 122 FTs, the performance and control variables correspond to 
2011/12.  
<<< Insert Figure 1 about here>>> 
In Figure 1, ellipses represent constructs made up of several items. Rectangles 
represent single-item constructs. If PRP mechanisms were based on Monitor’s ratings, 
FP and/or SQ would show a positive association with the remuneration of executive 
directors. Another relationship tested in the model is the relationship between the 
remuneration of non-executive directors and executive directors. As indicated above, 
non-executive directors set the remuneration of executive directors. Cardinaels (2009) 
indicates that CEOs earn more when the hospital’s supervisory board members receive 
more remuneration. Therefore, a positive relationship between the remuneration of the 
non-executive directors and the executive directors is expected. The model also includes 
the relationship between the performance measures and the remuneration of non-
executive directors. No significant relationship is expected because external 
professional advice is usually used to set the remuneration of the non-executive 
directors according to the benchmarks for this activity. 
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RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
The main descriptive statistics of the variables included in the analyses are 
presented in Table 1. The figures in Table 1 show the importance of the 130 FTs 
included in our analyses. These FTs had an income of £35 billion in 2012/13 and more 
than half a million workers. In the two financial years analyzed, the FTs had a good 
financial performance, with average quarterly FRRs of more than 3 and good GRRs, an 
average of 3, equivalent to an amber-green rating. However, the minimum values and 
the relatively high standard deviations of the FRRs and GRRs indicate that some FTs 
operated in a risky financial and service quality context. The total expenses related to 
the boards of directors were £145.5 million, £128 million for the executive directors and 
the rest for the non-executive directors. On average, the average expenses per executive 
director was 3.84 times the average expenses per worker whereas, for non-executive 
directors, this ratio was 0.5. 
<<< Insert Table 1 about here>>> 
Results of the Qualitative Analyses: Review of the Remuneration Reports 
We have reviewed explanations about 1) the remuneration policy, 2) statements 
about the adoption, or not, of a PRP scheme, 3) the presence of a column for bonuses 
and 4) the bonuses reported. Table 2 shows the results of our review.  
<<< Insert Table 2 about here>>> 
Table 2 shows that 27% of the FTs disclosed no information about how the 
remuneration of their executive directors was set. 14% reported conducting a 
benchmark process. 41% of the FTs indicated that the remuneration of the executive 
directors was set with a combination of a benchmark and performance appraisals. 17% 
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informed about conducting performance appraisals when setting the remuneration of 
their executive directors. Therefore, almost 60% of the FTs reported some performance 
appraisal in relation to the remuneration of their executive directors. In terms of whether 
the FTs had a PRP scheme to remunerate their executive directors, 66 FTs (47%) did 
not inform about this issue. Of the 74 FTs (53%) that informed about this aspect, only 
18 FTs explicitly declared having a PRP, whereas 56 FTs declared not having one.  
In the 2012/13 annual reports, the FTs that indicated that they conducted 
performance appraisals did not disclose information about how the appraisal was carried 
out, e.g., the indicators used or targets set, except for one FT (South West Yorkshire 
Partnership) that reported the specific corporate goals to be achieved. This was the only 
FT that clearly stated that there was a bonus (1.5%) linked to the achievement of 
corporate targets based on Monitor’s ratings. Additional individual bonuses were also 
possible, subject to the achievement of corporate objectives. This FT did not award any 
bonus in 2012/13 because the corporate objectives for 2011/12 were not achieved.  
An example that illustrates the reluctance to pay bonuses to the executive 
directors is the statement made in the annual report of North East London FT (NEL 
2013, 22): “Performance is assessed in relation to both organisational performance 
against agreed objectives and external measurements including regulatory information, 
and individual performance against annual personal objectives and contribution to the 
performance of the organisation. It is the current policy of the [remuneration] committee 
not to award any performance related bonus or other performance payment to executive 
directors.” On occasions, performance was assessed not for remuneration purposes, but 
for the continuation of the executive directors in office, as stated, for example, in the 
annual report of the Chesterfield Royal Hospital (CRH 2013, 107): “The Trust does not 
operate performance related-pay or bonuses. The performance of the Executive 
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Directors is assessed on a continuing basis via formal appraisal and unsatisfactory 
performance may provide grounds for termination of contract.”  
One example that shows the difficulties of paying bonuses can be found in the 
North Tees and Hartlepool Hospitals. This FT has had a PRP scheme in force since 
2008, when the remuneration committee approved one that measured both individual 
and collective performance, which would not be greater than 10% of directors’ salaries. 
The remuneration section stated (NTH 2013, 173): “All key indicators were achieved 
[for the financial year 2011/12] which would have indicated a bonus payment [in 
2012/13]. However, taking account of the current financial climate and the outcomes of 
national NHS pay negotiations, the Remuneration Committee decided to recognise the 
commitment and performance of the Executive team over the last year but not provide 
for a bonus payment.”  
 In the search for a column with bonuses, 26 FTs (18.7%) had one. Only 9 FTs 
reported paying any bonus. The total bonuses paid amounted to £354,000, less than 
0.3% of the total expenses of the executive directors, including £174,000 (4 FTs) 
received by their medical directors within the national Clinical Excellence Award 
Program. Part of the bonuses reported corresponded to results achieved in the previous 
year.  
 The qualitative analysis about the remuneration policies and bonuses disclosed 
in the annual reports indicates that PRP mechanisms were not popular among FTs to 
remunerate executive directors. In addition to this qualitative analysis, the quantitative 
analysis allow us to explain in greater depth factors related to the remuneration of 
directors, paying special attention to the performance attained and, thus, to the existence 
of undisclosed performance-related remuneration. In particular, we study whether 
23 
 
Monitor’s ratings were used to reward directors, particularly executive directors, either 
as salary or some other type of remuneration different from bonuses.  
Results of the Quantitative Analyses: The Structural Equation Model 
PLS analysis must be carried out in two independent stages: the measurement 
model analysis and the structural model analysis. The measurement model assessment 
involves the examination of the adequacy of the measurement scales. The analysis of 
the structural model focuses on testing the relationships between the constructs that 
compose the theoretical model.  
Results of the Measurement Model 
The results of the measurement model presented in this section are those of 
Model 1 (all the data refer to the financial year 2012/13). The results of Model 2, one-
year lag, show only minimal variations in the figures corresponding to these constructs 
and fulfill all the criteria to validate the measurement model. Therefore, results are not 
presented.  
We estimate the measurement model with PLS in order to analyze internal 
consistency. This process essentially involves three stages (Roldán and Sánchez-Franco 
2012). First, the unidimensionality of the indicators is evaluated using their factor 
loadings (λ). This permits an evaluation of whether or not each indicator of the 
construct is highly correlated with the characteristic that it intends to capture. All the 
factor loadings (λ) in Table 3 exceed the threshold of 0.7. Second, reliability is explored 
using Cronbach’s Alpha for simple reliability and the CRI value to measure composite 
reliability. Reliability indicates whether or not the set of variables are consistent in what 
they intend to measure. All the Cronbach’s Alpha coefficients and CRI values exceed 
the critical threshold of 0.7 (Carmines and Zeller 1979; Nunnally 1978). Third, validity 
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is assessed by using convergent validity and discriminant validity. Convergent validity 
is analyzed through average variance extracted (AVE) values and evaluates the degree 
to which the indicators represent the construct. Table 3 shows that all the AVE values 
are above 0.5, which guarantees convergent validity (Fornell and Larcker 1981). 
Discriminant validity indicates whether each construct in the model is significantly 
different from the others. The most accepted method to check for discriminant validity 
in PLS is the comparison of the square root of the AVE values and the correlation 
among variables (Chin 1998). Table 4 presents the square root of each construct’s AVE 
values on the diagonal, and the estimated correlations for each pair of constructs off the 
diagonal. This table confirms, for the 2012/13 financial year, the existence of 
discriminant validity between the constructs since the square root of each AVE value is 
higher than the estimated correlations.  
<<< Insert Table 3 about here>>> 
<<< Insert Table 4 about here>>> 
Results of the Structural Model 
Having confirmed the adequacy of the measurement scales for the constructs 
included in the model, the structural model is estimated. The results of two models are 
presented in Table 5. In Model 1, all the data refer to 2012/13. In Model 2, the data for 
the control variables and FP and SQ refer to 2011/12.  
<<< Insert Table 5 about here>>> 
To assess the significance of the path coefficients (β), a bootstrapping procedure 
with 5,000 subsamples has been used. Smart-PLS does not provide a global indicator of 
the goodness of fit of the whole model. To evaluate the predictive relevance of the 
model, the Stone-Geisser test is used. The Q2 value of this test for the remuneration 
variables is positive in the two models, thereby supporting the predictive relevance of 
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the model. The structural model is examined by observing the R2 values of the 
remuneration variables. Model 1 explains 24% of the variance in the construct reflecting 
the remuneration of executive directors and 11% of the variance in the construct 
reflecting the remuneration of non-executive directors. These figures are 23% and 19% 
in Model 2. The two models show a similar R2 for the remuneration of executive 
directors, the main focus of our study, whereas Model 2, one-year lag, better explains 
the remuneration of non-executive directors. Nonetheless, the results of the two models 
show that neither financial performance nor service quality is related to the 
remuneration of the executive directors. The size of the FTs is the only factor, for the 
two years, that is associated, at the 0.01 level, with this remuneration. Bigger 
organizations pay more to their executive directors. The remuneration levels of non-
executive directors, which form the remuneration committees, are not significantly 
related to the remuneration levels of executive directors. That is, it seems that non-
executive members do not use their salary as a reference to set the remuneration of their 
executive counterparts. Being located in the London or South East Coast areas has a 
negative association with the remuneration of the non-executive directors. On the 
contrary, size and being a mental health hospital have a positive association with the 
remuneration of these directors.  
Finally, although the analysis of the variables associated with the financial and 
quality performance is beyond the scope of this paper, different organizational factors, 
namely, the type of services provided, location and hospital complexity, are associated 
with financial performance, service quality or both. According to the results of Model 1, 
these factors explain about 30% of the variance of the financial performance (FP) and 
more than 25% of the service quality (SQ) of the FTs for the 2012/13 financial year. In 
particular, being a mental hospital and being located in the London or South East Coast 
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areas are related to obtaining better performance ratings, whereas more complex 
hospitals have greater difficulty in achieving good ratings.  
 
DISCUSSION 
NHS FTs enjoy great freedom and flexibility in setting the remuneration of their 
top managers, operate in a transparent performance regime and are managed by a board 
of directors. These circumstances provide a favorable environment for implementing 
PRP mechanisms. However, a favorable organizational context does not seem to be 
enough. The results of our qualitative analyses indicate that these entities had not 
adopted these mechanisms in the year analyzed or, if they had, they resulted in hardly 
any bonus payments.  
The most common remuneration policy for executive directors reported by FTs 
was a combination of benchmark and performance appraisals. The benchmark was 
mainly based on some “market rate” using local comparisons or salary surveys for NHS 
executive directors. It is not possible to know how performance appraisals were carried 
out, or what indicators were used for the appraisal, because no specific indicators were 
disclosed in the annual reports. Thus, the transparency required for performance 
assessments to be effective is not achieved and further research (e.g., 
surveys/interviews) is needed to clarify the specific measures used in the performance 
appraisals. There seems to be a formal adherence to the adoption of the remuneration 
policy envisaged by Monitor, which sets several recommendations about how to link 
performance and remuneration, as 60% of the FTs state that they use some form of 
performance appraisal.  
The number of FTs that clearly state having a PRP scheme is very low, less than 
15%, with just one FT disclosing the use of Monitor’s ratings scores to set the targets on 
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which bonuses are based. The proportion of FTs that reported paying any bonus is even 
lower. Excerpts from the remuneration sections show the reluctance of FTs to pay 
bonuses, with performance being assessed not for remuneration purposes, but for the 
continuation of the executive directors in office. The case of the North Tees and 
Hartlepool Hospitals also shows that sometimes the public sector faces additional 
difficulties when adopting PRP, as paying bonuses may not be considered appropriate in 
a general context of budget and financial constraints. In this case, although the 
executive directors had achieved the targets and, thus, had the right to receive a bonus, 
the remuneration committee rewarded them with recognition rather than money.  
In addition to the qualitative analysis, a quantitative analysis, using structural 
equation models, has been conducted to determine what factors are associated with the 
remuneration of the members of the boards of directors, particularly executive directors, 
and whether there is a relationship between Monitor’s performance ratings and 
remuneration. These performance ratings were key for FTs because they were the ones 
used by Monitor to assess their financial performance and service quality. The size of 
the FT has been found to have a positive and significant association with the 
remuneration of executive directors, which seems logical because bigger hospitals 
manage more resources and have higher activity levels, resulting in more work for 
them.  
Contrary to the study of Cardinaels (2009), we have found no significant 
association between the remuneration of non-executive directors, the only directors that 
can belong to the remuneration committee, and the remuneration of executive directors. 
Hospital location, hospital size and the type of services provided are associated with the 
remuneration of the non-executive directors. These results indicate that benchmarking 
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processes, based on organizational characteristics, are conducted when setting the 
remuneration of these directors.  
Our results show that there is no relationship between Monitor's performance 
ratings and the remuneration level of the executive directors. This finding is in 
agreement with the Cockburn Report about Pay for NHS Very Senior Managers 
(Cockburn 2012) which states that, although FTs are public sector bodies that have the 
freedom to set salaries, they do not tend to use this flexibility. For public sector 
professionals, within the PSM framework, intrinsic rewards may be more important 
than extrinsic monetary rewards. Moreover, accepting bonus payments might be 
perceived as an incentive that would focus them on achieving individual benefits rather 
than on the performance of their organizations.  
PSM and Stewardship theories help us to justify the lack of adoption of PRP 
mechanisms in FTs. According to these theories, stewards’ interests and motivations are 
directed to organizational, rather than personal, objectives. Individuals working in the 
public sector are usually motivated by altruism, not by self-interest; their strong 
organizational commitment helps them to align their behavior with the overall 
objectives of the organization (Markovits et al. 2010). In addition, public sector workers 
value other intrinsic rewards such as job satisfaction or reputation. For public sector 
organizations, strong reputation is a competitive advantage and a valuable political asset 
because it can be used to generate public support to obtain higher levels of autonomy, to 
protect the entity from political attack, and to recruit and retain valued employees 
(Wæraas and Byrkjeflot 2012). Reputation might be especially important for FTs’ 
executive directors because of the prominent role they play in these key public sector 
organizations. Receiving bonuses for “doing their job” might damage the opinion of 
citizens and patients about those who manage such key organizations for them, that is, 
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“their public hospital”. According to Ellwood and Garcia-Lacalle (2015), the 
stewardship approach of FT boards enhances their focus on the interests of their key 
stakeholders. Therefore, there seems to be no need to pay more for better performance 
scores.  
The results of the quantitative analysis are consistent with the results of the 
qualitative analysis. No PRP mechanisms using Monitor’s ratings are detected. As 
stated, this indicates both reluctance to and difficulties in adopting PRP in public sector 
entities. However, due to the nature of our research, other explanations may be valid, 
and we cannot completely discard them. One possible explanation for the lack of bonus 
payments in the FTs might be that their boards of directors did not achieve their targets, 
in particular because, the years analyzed fall within a period of financial crisis. If the 
lack of bonus payments is because boards of directors consistently failed to achieve 
their targets this would be indicative of generalized problems in the design of PRP 
mechanisms. Second, some FTs might be using other performance measures, at the 
individual or collective level, to reward their executive directors. However, this is 
highly unlikely because of the low levels of disclosure of bonus payments in the 
remuneration reports. In addition, the use of other performance measures may not fulfill 
some of the effectiveness criteria pointed out by Bevan (2010), such as being widely 
reported and understood by the public.  
According to Monitor, the members of the board of directors are ultimately and 
collectively responsible for all aspects of the performance of the FTs. However, 
according to Mannion and Davis (2008), in many occasions, the identification of those 
responsible for performance achievements and the attribution of rewards is difficult. 
The lack of adoption of PRP mechanisms to remunerate board members in FTs may 
also aim to avoid tensions between board members and other managers who may also 
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consider themselves to have a great deal of responsibility for performance achievements 
in this highly professional environment. 
Further research is needed to ascertain whether PRP in the public sector is 
effective, perverse or unnecessary. The adoption of PRP is a pre-requisite for this type 
of analysis, which is not the case in the context analyzed. Thus, our study does not 
allow us to provide arguments about whether executive directors are knights or knaves. 
On the contrary, our results suggest another role for the executive directors of NHS FTs. 
They act like stewards in an “odd” kingdom that uses performance ratings to evaluate 
organizations, blaming directors when ratings are bad, but with no rewards when good 
performance is achieved. In the “NHS kingdom,” the relationship between 
organizational performance and CEO turnover is significant (Ballantine et al. 2008), 
whereas that between performance and pay is not.  
Performance measurement is a key element when implementing a PRP scheme 
and the results of our quantitative analyses have shown that some organizational factors 
over which managers have little or no control, influenced Monitor’s ratings. Thus, these 
ratings are capturing, in part, organizational differences, rather than managerial action. 
In the context analyzed, if Monitor’s performance ratings had been used to implement 
PRP, the directors of some hospitals would have had problems in getting bonuses. Some 
of the internal organizational characteristics of these hospitals (type, location and 
complexity) have an influence on organizational performance and are beyond directors’ 
direct capacity for action. Therefore, caution is needed with the performance 
measurement system when adopting PRP in the public sector.  
Before concluding this section, the limitations of this study have to be 
acknowledged. First, we have studied the performance-remuneration relationship in the 
short term, with cross-sectional data and a one-year lag for performance figures. Future 
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studies could also analyze this relationship in the long term, including years with more 
favorable economic conditions. Second, as indicated above, some FTs report conducting 
individual and collective performance appraisals, so they might be using performance 
measures different from Monitor’s ratings, at the individual or collective level, to 
reward their executive directors. Although, in the year analyzed, hardly any FT reported 
bonuses, future research should analyze the relationship between performance ratings 
and the individual remuneration of directors.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The adoption of performance-related pay (PRP) continues to be one of the most 
significant challenges of public sector reforms. The problems of defining and assessing 
performance in public sector organizations and of identifying those responsible for the 
achievements make it difficult to translate performance into monetary rewards. This 
study analyzes the remuneration of the members of the boards of directors of NHS FTs 
using a qualitative approach, content analysis of the annual reports, and a quantitative 
approach, a structural equation model. FTs provide a favorable context in which to 
study the introduction of these mechanisms in public sector organizations: they have the 
freedom to implement PRP mechanisms and that implementation is backed by their 
watchdog; they operate within a transparent performance regime and are managed by 
boards of directors within a strong corporate governance context. However, having a 
favorable organizational context does not seem to be enough, which shows that the 
adoption of PRP mechanisms is neither easy nor immediate. 
FTs declare some performance appraisal to evaluate their executive directors, 
which indicates a formal adoption of recommendations envisaged by their regulator, 
Monitor. However, they are reluctant to adopt and enforce PRP mechanisms and, when 
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adopted, they do not provide details about their functioning. Our results show that the 
remuneration of the executive directors is related to the size of the FT, but neither the 
financial performance nor service quality ratings are related to the remuneration of 
executive directors. The remuneration of non-executive directors is mainly set using 
benchmark processes.  
The Public Service Motivation approach and the Stewardship theory help to 
explain the lack of adoption of PRP: executive directors, aware of the importance of 
achieving good performance in this key public service, may not need monetary rewards 
to do their job. In any case, our results indicate both reluctance to and difficulties in 
adopting PRP in public sector entities. These results suggest that the executive directors 
of NHS FTs are stewards in an “odd” kingdom, who do not receive bonuses when 
performance is good, but who can be punished (e.g., with contract termination) for bad 
performance.  
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This work was supported by the Spanish National R&D Plan under Grant ECO2015-
66240P (MINECO/FEDER); the Government of Aragón/FEDER under Grant 
Gespública (S56-17R); and the University of Zaragoza under Grant JIUZ-2017-SOC-
11. The authors also thank the anonymous reviewers and the editor for their valuable 
feedback. 
REFERENCES 
Anderfuhren-Biget S., F. Varone, D. Giauque and A. Ritz. 2010. “Motivating 
Employees of the Public Sector: Does Public Service Motivation Matter?” International 
Public Management Journal 13(3): 213-246. 
Bajorek, Z.M. and S.M. Bevan. 2015. “Performance-related-pay in the UK public 
sector. A review of the recent evidence on effectiveness and value for money.” Journal 
of Organizational Effectiveness: People and Performance 2(2): 94-109.  
Ballantine, J., J. Forker and M. Greenwood. 2008. “The Governance of CEO Incentives 
in English NHS Hospital Trusts.” Financial Accountability & Management 24(4): 385-
410.  
33 
 
Ballou, J.P. and B. A. Weisbrod. 2003. “Managerial rewards and the behavior of for-
profit, governmental, and nonprofit organizations: evidence from the hospital industry.” 
Journal of Public Economics 87: 1895-1920. 
Bellé, N. 2015. “Performance-Related Pay and the Crowding Out of Motivation in the 
Public Sector: A Randomized Field Experiment.” Public Administration Review 75(2): 
230–241. 
Bevan, G. 2010. “Performance Measurement of ‘Knights’ and ‘Knaves’: Differences in 
Approaches and Impacts in British Countries after Devolution.” Journal of Comparative 
Policy Analysis: Research and Practice 12(1-2): 33-56. 
Boyd, B.K., K.T. Haynes and F. Zona. 2011. “Dimensions of CEO–Board Relations.” 
Journal of Management Studies 48(8): 1892-1923. 
Bozeman, B. and X. Su. 2015. “Public Service Motivation Concepts and Theory: A 
Critique.” Public Administration Review 75(5): 700–710. 
Bregn, K. 2013. “Detrimental Effects of Performance-Related Pay in the Public Sector? 
On the Need for a Broader Theoretical Perspective.” Public Organization Review 13(1): 
21-35. 
Brewer, G.A. and R. M. Walker. 2013. “Personnel Constraints in Public Organizations: 
The Impact of Reward and Punishment on Organizational Performance.” Public 
Administration Review 73(1): 121–131. 
Caers, R., C. Du Bois, M. Jegers, S. De Gieter, C. Schepers and R. Pepermans. 2006. 
“Principal-Agent Relationships on the Stewardship-Agency Axis.” Nonprofit 
Management & Leadership 17(1): 25-47.  
Cardinaels, E. 2009. “Governance in non-for-profit hospitals: Effects of board 
members’ remuneration and expertise on CEO compensation.” Health Policy 93: 64-75. 
Carlin, T. and J. Guthrie. 2001. “The new business of government budgeting: Reporting 
non-financial performance information in Victoria.” Australian Accounting Review 
11(3): 17. 
Carmines E. and R. Zeller. 1979. “Reliability and validity assessment”. In Sage 
University Paper Series on Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences 07-017 
Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
Carpenter, J., D. Doverspike and R.F. Miguel. 2012. “Public service motivation as a 
predictor of attraction to the public sector.” Journal of Vocational Behavior 80: 509–
523 
Chin, W.W. 1998. “Issues and opinions on structural equation modeling.” MIS 
Quarterly 22(1): 7-16. 
Choi, S. and A.B. Whitford. 2017. “Employee Satisfaction in Agencies with Merit-
Based Pay: Differential Effects for Three Measures.” International Public Management 
Journal 20(3): 442-466. 
Cockburn, B. 2012. Report on Locality Pay for NHS Very Senior Managers 2012 
(Report No. 80). London, UK: Office of Manpower Economics.  
Condrey, S.E., R.L Facer II and J.J. Llorens. 2012. “Getting It Right: How and Why We 
Should Compare Federal and Private Sector Compensation.” Public Administration 
Review 72(6): 784-785.  
34 
 
Christensen, R.K., L. Paarlberg and J.L. Perry. 2017. “Public Service Motivation 
Research: Lessons for Practice.” Public Administration Review 77(4): 529–542. 
CRH. 2013. Annual Report and Accounts 2012/13. Calow, Chesterfield, UK: 
Chesterfield Royal Hospital. 
Davis, J.H., F.D. Schoorman and L. Donaldson. 1997. “Toward a Stewardship Theory 
of Management.” Academy of Management Review 22: 20–47. 
Dixit, A. 2002. “Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative 
Review.” The Journal of Human Resources 37(4): 696-727. 
DoH. 2010. Equity and excellence: Liberating the NHS (Cm 7881). London, UK: 
Department of Health. 
DoH. 2012. A simple guide to Payment by Results. Leeds, UK: Payment by Results 
Team. Department of Health. 
Ducharme, M.J., P. Singh and M. Podolsky. 2005. “Exploring the links between 
performance appraissals and pay satisfaction.” Compensation and Benefits Review 
37(5): 46-52.  
Eijkenaar, F., M. Emmert, M. Scheppach and O. Schöffski. 2013. “Effects of pay for 
performance in health care: A systematic review of systematic reviews.” Health Policy 
110: 115-130. 
Eldenburg, L. and R. Krishnan. 2003. “Public versus private governance: a study of 
incentives and operational performance.” Journal of Accounting and Economics 35: 
377–404. 
Ellwood, S. and J. Garcia-Lacalle. 2015. “The influence of presence and position of 
women on the boards of directors: the case of NHS foundation trusts.” Journal of 
Business Ethics 130(1): 69-84. 
Ellwood, S. and J. García-Lacalle. 2016. “Examining Audit Committees in the 
Corporate Governance of Public Bodies.” Public Management Review 18(8): 1138-
1162.  
Fleetcroft, R., N. Steel, R. Cookson, S. Walker and A. Howe. 2012. “Incentive 
payments are not related to expected health gain in the pay for performance scheme for 
UK primary care: cross-sectional analysis.” BMC Health Services Research 12: 94. 
Fornell, C. and D. Larcker. 1981. “Evaluating structural equation models with 
unobservable variables and measurement error.” Journal of Marketing Research 18: 39-
50. 
French, P.E. and M.C. Emerson. 2014. “Assessing the Variations in Reward Preference 
for Local Government Employees in Terms of Position, Public Service Motivation, and 
Public Sector Motivation.” Public Performance & Management Review 37(4): 552-576. 
Frey, B.S., F. Homberg and M. Osterloch. 2013. “Organizational Control Systems and 
Pay-for-Performance in the Public Service.” Organization Studies 34(7): 949–972. 
FPH. 2013. Annual Report and Accounts 2012-2013. Frimley, Camberley, UK: Frimley 
Park Hospital. 
Georgellis, Y., E. Iossa and V. Tabvuma. 2011. “Crowding Out Intrinsic Motivation in 
the Public Sector.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 21(3): 473–
493.  
35 
 
Gillam, S.J., A.N. Siriwardena and N. Steel. 2012. “Pay-for-Performance in the United 
Kingdom: Impact of the Quality and Outcomes Framework—A Systematic Review.” 
Annals of Family Medicine 10(5): 461-468. 
Hair, J.F., M. Sarstedt, C.M. Ringle and J.A. Mena. 2012. “An assessment of the use of 
partial least squares structural equation modelling in marketing research.” Journal of the 
Academy. Marketing Science 40: 414–433. 
Jobome, G.O. 2006. “Management Pay, Governance and Performance: The Case of 
Large UK Nonprofits.” Financial Accountability & Management 22(4): 331-358. 
Kim, J. 2010. “Strategic Human Resource Practices: Introducing Alternatives for 
Organizational Performance Improvement in the Public Sector.” Public Administration 
Review 70(1): 38–49. 
Kjeldsen, A.M. 2012. “Dynamics of Public Service Motivation: Attraction and 
Socialization Effects in the Production and Regulation of Social Services”. Paper 
presented at the 16th Annual Conference of the International Research Society for 
Public Management, April 11–13, Rome, Italy. 
Langbein, L. 2010. “Economics, Public Service Motivation, and Pay for Performance: 
Complements or Substitutes?” International Public Management Journal 13(1): 9-23. 
Le Grand, J. 2010. “Knights and Knaves Return: Public Service Motivation and the 
Delivery of Public Services.” International Public Management Journal 13(1): 56-71. 
Lee, Y-J. and V.M. Wilkins. 2011. “More Similarities or More Differences? Comparing 
Public and Nonprofit Managers’ Job Motivations.” Public Administration Review 71(1): 
45-56. 
Lewis, D.E. 2010. “Measurement and Public Service Motivation: New Insights, Old 
Questions.” International Public Management Journal 13(1): 46-55. 
Lord Hutton Report. 2011. Hutton Review of Fair Pay in the public sector: Final 
Report. London, UK: Information Policy Team. 
Mannion, R. and H.T.O. Davies. 2008. “Payment for performance in health care.” BMJ 
336: 306-308.  
Marsden, D. 2004. “The role of performance-related pay in renegotiating the "effort 
bargain": the case of the British public service.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 
57(3): 350-370. 
Markovits Y., A.J. Davis, D. Fay and R. van Dick. 2010. “The Link Between Job 
Satisfaction and Organizational Commitment: Differences Between Public and Private 
Sector Employees.” International Public Management Journal 13(2): 177-196. 
Monitor. 2010. The NHS Foundation Trust Code of Governance. London, UK: Monitor.  
Monitor. 2012. Compliance Framework 2012/13. London, UK: Monitor. 
Monitor. 2013a. NHS foundation trusts: consolidated accounts 2012/13. London, UK: 
Monitor. 
Monitor. 2013b. NHS Foundation Trust Annual Reporting Manual for 2012/13. 
London, UK: Monitor. 
Moynihan, D.P. 2013. “Does Public Service Motivation Lead to Budget Maximization? 
Evidence from an Experiment.” International Public Management Journal 16(2):179-
196. 
36 
 
NEL. 2013. Annual Report and Accounts 2012/13. Ilford, UK: North East London NHS 
Foundation Trust.  
Newton, A.N. 2015. “Executive compensation, organizational performance, and 
governance quality in the absence of owners.” Journal of Corporate Finance 30: 195–
222. 
NTH. 2013. Annual Report and Accounts 2012-2013. Hardwick, Stockton, UK: North 
Tees and Hartlepool NHS Foundation Trust. 
Nunnally, J.C. 1978. Psychometric theory. New York, NY: McGraw Hill. 
Ogundeji, Y.K., J.M. Bland and T.A. Sheldon. 2016. “The effectiveness of payment for 
performance in health care: A meta-analysis and exploration of variation in outcomes.” 
Health Policy 120: 1141-1150. 
Perry, J.L., T.A. Engbers and S.Y. Jun. 2009. “Back to the Future? Performance-
Related Pay, Empirical Research, and the Perils of Persistence.” Public Administration 
Review 69: 39- 51. 
Perry, J.L. and L.R. Wise. 1990. “The Motivational Bases of Public Service.” Public 
Administration Review 50(3): 367–73. 
Preyra, C. and G. Pink. 2001. “Balancing incentives in the compensation contracts of 
nonprofit hospital CEOs.” Journal of Health Economics 20: 509–525. 
Ritz, A., G.A. Brewer and O. Neumann. 2016. “Public Service Motivation: A 
Systematic Literature Review and Outlook.” Public Administration Review 76(3), 414-
426.  
Roldán, J. and M. Sánchez-Franco. 2012. “Variance-based structural equation 
modeling: guidelines for using Partial Least Squares in information systems research.” 
Pp. 193-221 in Research Methodologies, Innovations and Philosophies in Software 
Systems Engineering and Information Systems, edited by Manuel Mora, Ovsei Gelman, 
Annette L. Steenkamp and Mahesh Raisinghani. Hershey, PA: IGI Global. 
Ryan, A.M., J. Blustein and L.P. Casalino. 2012. “Medicare’s Flagship Test Of Pay-
For-Performance Did Not Spur More Rapid Quality Improvement Among Low-
Performing Hospitals.” Health Affairs 31(4): 797-805. 
Serrano-Cinca, C., Y. Fuertes-Callén and B. Gutiérrez-Nieto. 2007. “Online reporting 
by banks: a structural modelling approach.” Online Information Review 31(3): 310-332. 
Suff, P., P. Reilly, and A. Cox. 2007. Paying for Performance New trends in 
performance-related pay. Brighton, UK: Institute for Employment Studies. 
Van Herck, P., D. De Smedt, L. Annemans, R. Remmen, M.B. Rosenthal and W. 
Sermeus. 2010. “Systematic review: Effects, design choices, and context of pay-for-
performance in health care.” BMC Health Services Research 10: 247-260. 
Wæraas, A. and H. Byrkjeflot. 2012. “Public Sector Organizations and Reputation 
Management: Five Problems.” International Public Management Journal 15(2): 186-
206. 
Weibel, A., K. Rost and M. Osterloh. 2010. “Pay for Performance in the Public 
Sector—Benefits and (Hidden) Costs.” Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory 20(2): 387-412. 
37 
 
Wright, B. E. and R.K. Christensen. 2010. “Public Service Motivation: A Test of the 
Job Attraction–Selection–Attrition Model.” International Public Management Journal 
13(2): 155-176. 
Wright, B.E., R.K. Christensen and S.K. Pandey. 2013. “Measuring Public Service 
Motivation: Exploring the Equivalence of Existing Global Measures.” International 
Public Management Journal 16(2): 197-223. 
38 
 
Figure 1. Model for the remuneration of the boards of directors  
 
Notes: Rectangles represent variables made up of a single indicator. Ellipses represent “constructs” made 
up of several items. 
 Dotted lines represent the relationship between control variables and performance and 
remuneration. Continuous lines represent the relationship between performance and remuneration 
as well as the remuneration between non-executives and executives directors.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the items included in the analysis (N = 130) 
ITEM Total Mean Min Max Std Dev 
Total assets (₤000) 25,560,822 196,622 11,454 858,653 133,895 
Operating income (₤000) 35,311,917 271,630 22,075 894,749 162,915 
Staff  521,561 4,012 289 12,146 2,059 
Type of services (Mental health= 
“1”)* 38 (29%)     
Location (London and south        
east coast = “1”)* 25 (19%)     
Complexity  
(Non-current assets/Total assets)  0.74 0.28 0.93 0.10 
FRR Q1 2012/13  3.23 1 5 0.85 
FRR Q2 2012/13  3.30 1 5 0.85 
FRR Q3 2012/13  3.36 1 5 0.93 
FRR Q4 2012/13  3.45 1 5 0.92 
GRR Q1 2012/13  3.22 1 4 1.06 
GRR Q2 2012/13  3.28 1 4 1.04 
GRR Q3 2012/13  3.15 1 4 1.14 
GRR Q4 2012/13  3.03 1 4 1.11 
FRR Q1 2011/12  3.33 1 5 0.85 
FRR Q2 2011/12  3.35 1 5 0.85 
FRR Q3 2011/12  3.41 1 5 0.82 
FRR Q4 2011/12  3.48 1 5 0.78 
GRR Q1 2011/12  2.95 1 4 1.06 
GRR Q2 2011/12  3.05 1 4 1.01 
GRR Q3 2011/12  3.04 1 4 1.07 
GRR Q4 2011/12  3.14 1 4 1.03 
meanExecExp  158,543 65,500 319,000 40,160 
relatExecExp  3.84 1.56 7.50 1.00 
meanNonexecExp  20,046 11,500 35,500 3,923 
relatNonexecExp  0.49 0.21 1.06 0.11 
Exec directors’ expenses 
(£000)** 128,404 988 422 1,903 282 
Non-Exec directors’ expenses 
(£000)** 17,162 132 70 234 25 
Notes: Figures for the year 2012/13, except for FRR and GRR presented also for 2011/12 (N=122). 
             * The data included in the table are the number of FTs with “1” (and % of “1” over total).  
           ** Not included in the analyses. Provided for information purposes. 
40 
 
 
Table 2. Review of the remuneration section in the annual reports (2012/13)  
1) Remuneration policy (N=140) n % 
Benchmark + performance appraisal 58 41.4 
Benchmark 20 14.3 
Performance appraisal 24 17.2 
No information 38 27.1 
2) Statement about PRP (N=140) 
Yes, with explicit reference to a PRP scheme 18 12.9 
Yes, but explicitly indicates that no PRP scheme has been adopted 56  40.0 
No statement about PRP 66  47.1 
3) Bonus column in the remuneration table (N=139*) 26 18.7 
4) Amount reported in the bonus column (N = 26)  
Some amount reported 9  
Total amount of bonuses reported  £354,000** 
Notes: *The table of one FT was illegible and, thus, excluded from the analysis. 
           ** £174,000 corresponding to the Clinical Excellence Award Program. 
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Table 3. Measurement model (Model 1) 
Factor Indicator 
Factors 
loadings 
(λ) 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Composite 
Reliability 
Index (CRI) 
Average 
Variance 
Extracted 
(AVE) 
Size 
Total assets 
Total Income 
Staff 
0.9491 
0.9923 
0.9687 
0.9690 0.9796 0.9413 
FP  
FRR Q1 
FRR Q2 
FRR Q3 
FRR Q4 
0.9414 
0.9549 
0.9561 
0.9119 
0.9570 0.9688 0.8859 
SQ 
GRR Q1 
GRR Q2 
GRR Q3 
GRR Q4 
0.8214 
0.8993 
0.8964 
0.8515 
0.8913 0.9241 0.7530 
ExecDirRemun meanExecExp relatExecExp 
0.9804 
0.9786 0.9578 0.9793 0.9595 
NonexecDirRemun meanNonexecExp relatNonexecExp 
0.9612 
0.9766 0.9358 0.9684 0.9388 
Note: Information presented only for the constructs made up of two or more items. 
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Table 4. Correlations to determine discriminant validity (Model 1) 
            Complexity 
ExecDir 
Remun FP Location 
NonExec 
DirRemun SQ Size Type 
Complexity 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ExecDirRemun 0.087 0.980 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FP -0.488 -0.077 0.941 0 0 0 0 0 
Location -0.040 -0.016 0.185 1 0 0 0 0 
NonexecDirRemun 0.067 0.191 -0.037 -0.134 0.969 0 0 0 
SQ -0.315 -0.131 0.643 0.250 -0.001 0.868 0 0 
Size 0.312 0.437 -0.057 0.064 0.219 -0.107 0.970 0 
Type of services -0.240 0.031 0.288 0.073 0.138 0.400 -0.199 1 
Note: Figures on the diagonal (bold) are the square root of the AVE values. Off-diagonal figures are the 
construct correlations 
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Table 5. Results of the structural model 
  Model 1 (N=130) Model 2 (N=122) 
                        β t-value β t-value 
Size -> ExecDirRemun 0.465 6.376** 0.461 5.960** 
Type of services-> ExecDirRemun 0.162 1.862 0.146 1.555 
Location -> ExecDirRemun -0.008 0.082 -0.013 0.126 
Complexity -> ExecDirRemun -0.091 0.945 -0.109 1.176 
FP -> ExecDirRemun -0.045 0.360 -0.152 1.344 
SQ -> ExecDirRemun -0.144 1.391 -0.001 0.014 
NonExecDirRemun -> ExecDirRemun  0.070 0.865 0.092 1.089 
Size -> NonexecDirRemun 0.270 1.932 0.296 2.389* 
Type of services-> NonexecDirRemun 0.213 2.385* 0.141 1.668 
Location -> NonexecDirRemun -0.161 2.113* -0.179 2.264* 
Complexity -> NonexecDirRemun 0.002 0.016 0.139 1.138 
FP -> NonexecDirRemun -0.071 0.423 0.214 1.935 
SQ -> NonexecDirRemun 0.028 0.194 0.036 0.402 
Size -> FP 0.119 0.978 0.138 0.927 
Size -> SQ 0.018 0.171 -0.025 0.279 
Type of services-> FP 0.188 2.311* 0.252 2.740** 
Type of services-> SQ 0.333 4.997** 0.194 2.265* 
Location -> FP 0.145 1.930 0.108 1.263 
Location -> SQ 0.215 3.892** 0.276 4.292** 
Complexity -> FP -0.474 6.555** -0.348 2.637** 
Complexity -> SQ -0.232 2.863** -0.127 1.274 
R² for ExecDirRemun   0.236    0.228   
R² for NonexecDirRemun  0.113    0.191   
R² for FP  0.306    0.216   
R² for SQ  0.258    0.151   
Q2 for ExecDirRemun  0.227    0.194   
Q² for NonexecDirRemun  0.104    0.197   
Q2 for FP  0.266    0.180   
Q² for SQ  0.188    0.100   
Note: ** significant at the 0.01 level; * significant at the 0.05 level.  
 
